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Abstract: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 has been described as one of the best 
in the world. According to Karl Klare, this Constitution is a transformative instrument which offers 
an enterprise to induce major social change. It is for this reason that various normative approaches, 
guided significantly by various interpretive methods, including Dworkin’s, emerged from the reading 
of every constitutional provision. This has been prevalent since the early days of the post-1994 
democratic dispensation, under which the courts have been actively involved in attempting to ensure 
meaningful realisation and enjoyment of civil and political rights, socio-economic rights and third-
generation rights. The Constitutional Court, which inadvertently became both a constitutional and 
human rights activist, has particularly been at the forefront. However, the extent to which the 
Constitution is the “best” is a matter that has not been expansively dealt with. Thus, this article proffers a 
critical reflection of the ‘best Constitution’ narrative, especially within the context of transformation and 
distribution of constitutional law knowledge. This derives significant impetus from Klare’s 
conceptualisation of a social change phenomenon, with the view towards finding strategic mechanisms 
of reformatting legal knowledge (constitutional and human rights knowledge) in the contemporary South 
Africa. At the center of attention is the idea of explaining constitutionally entrenched norms that 
subscribes to strict legal approach, whereas aspects deriving from morality could have been opted 
for, in order to mutually locate solutions or mechanisms that would effectively advance noble 
agendas of reconciliation, transformation and decolonisation. The article addresses two prime research 
questions: first, why the Constitution is described as the best? and, second, why there is a need to 
harmonise law and morality to realise social and economic transformation. The article adopts a 
theory-based analysis, relying fundamentally on theoretical connotations founded in Fanon’s conception 
of change and leadership, Klare’s Transformative Constitutionalism and Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach. 
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1. Introduction and Context 
Like never before, South Africa’s transformation trajectory desperately requires 
reorientation. Such adaptation must creatively invent normative moral strategy in 
order for the post-1994 constitutional order to continue to preserve a genuine societal 
legitimacy. Meaningful post-apartheid social, political and economic transformation 
cannot be substituted with unsubstantiated, hopeless semantics such as the “best 
constitution” narrative, which does nothing big, except attempting to render the 
awful past injustices inconsequential. In this regard, Villa-Vicencio (1991, p. 141) 
vehemently warned that any nation which ignores history is most likely to become 
victim of the same history. This view is more applicable to South Africa. Therefore, 
does the post-1994 Constitution manifest necessary cognizance that there remains 
an urgent need to uproot the diabolical effects of the historic policy of apartheid, 
which was spearheaded through legislation, and which caused socio-economic 
palpitations on most South Africans? According to Hugh Corder (1994, p. 491), the 
extreme disparities of socio-economic welfare occupied a central position during 
negotiations for transition from apartheid to democracy. This entails that the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter, the Constitution), 
inherited an inherent obligation to prioritise addressing the question of safeguarding 
human wellbeing in a manner that would reinforce efforts of normalizing society. 
The Constitution also had to oversee a departure from a deeply divided past 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustices that are reckoned as 
the worst transgressions of humanitarian principles. Yes, the Bill of Rights promotes 
liberty and equal justice under law (Goldstone, 1997, p. 451), but would a 
constitutional enshrinement alone be capable of delivering immediate or progressive 
redress of pervasive historical deprivations? 
It is worth noting that South Africa is amongst notable countries of the world that 
have traversed a multiplicity of notorious phases in history. This is with reference to 
matters of governance, construction of governance structures, social relations and 
human sufferings, and the establishment of both normative and institutional 
frameworks. For instance, a Constitutional Convention of 1908-1909 produced the 
union-level institutions (Celerant, 2014, p. 627), which culminated in the Union of 
South Africa, whose laws would thenceforth entrench racial discrimination and 
social injustices. And, during every such phase, the law was constantly deployed 
either as a tool to provide normative guidance and regulatory mechanism, or as an 
instrument to effectuate such human oppression, subjugations and denial of 
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fundamental freedoms. For example, the promulgation and enforcement of the 
Natives’ Land Act 27 of 1913 was utilised to deprive the natives of land ownership, 
thus haphazardly imposing hardship and physical sufferings (Plaatjie, 1916, pp. 176-
178), with the subsequent apartheid system later in nineteen forty-eight (1948) 
becoming an official government policy whose prime purpose was to entrench 
pervasive inequalities, deprivation of human dignity and fundamental freedoms, and 
disenfranchisement amongst others. When sharply scrutinised, one realises that for 
the better part of the twentieth century, South Africa’s natives have been engaged in 
a constant struggle to uproot unjust laws and eliminate racial prejudice, in order that 
people’s human dignity, equality as a virtue and as a right, and fundamental freedoms 
may be restored. Whether these ideals were to be achieved within or outside the 
bounds of the law would be immaterial. Hence, it has been argued that majority of 
South Africans deeply supported the cause against apartheid because they wanted 
the law, if ever there were to be laws, to protect them and preserve their worth as 
humans (Currie & de Waal, 2005; Rapatsa, 2015, p. 19). Therefore, and most 
importantly, our sustained discourses in constitutional law would be incomplete lest 
we shy away from confronting cold realities that seek to challenge the role of the 
present Constitution and its variety of statutory instruments promulgated to give 
effect to it, when it comes to eradicating past injustices and normalising society. This 
article is one such contribution which seeks to understand why the Constitution is 
labelled as the best in the world whereas those historical social and economic 
quandaries remain prevalent. 
Comparable to the Constitutional Convention of 1908, several constitutional 
negotiations were held during the early nineteen-nineties, when apartheid became 
unsustainable and began crumbling. In the main, processes such as Convention for 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) 
were held, with the MPNP said to have culminated in a new Constitution being 
negotiated and drafted. The crafters of such Constitution and its post-1994 
democratic dispensation designed the law in the Constitution and presented it in such 
a way that it would be viewed as a soul provider and a precursor of peace. But did 
they realise that inherent to the struggle against apartheid was the whole idea of 
fighting to achieve social and economic wellbeing? These ideals would, once 
achieved, in turn foster the advancement of social justice in an egalitarian setting. 
Therefore, this article attempt to deal with the above critical question in order to 
properly locate the role of the Constitution and its strength towards securing social 
justice in the contemporary South Africa. Perhaps, it is worth mentioning at the 
outset that the struggle against apartheid was essentially not about constructing the 
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best Constitution in the world. Liberation movements were born because social 
justice activists and philosophers such as Sol Plaatjie, Prixley ka Isaka Seme, Bantu 
Biko, and many more were austerely opposed to racially motivated policies that 
entrenched material disadvantage. They wanted an end to oppression, elimination of 
poverty and realisation of a better life for all.  
Fast forward, the Constitution has been and is now being hailed as one of the best in 
the world. However, very limited discourses nor constitutional law scholars have 
convincingly dared explain the meaning of this “best Constitution narrative”, except 
that there have been numerous attempts to justify this by citing the inclusion of 
certain constitutional elements in it (such as justiciable socio-economic rights) as 
adequate tenets to validate describing it as the best. Yes, the Constitution captures 
all forms of human rights (civil and political rights, socio-economic rights and 
developmental and environmental rights), and went on to establish Chapter 9 
Institutions1 to support democracy, which entails, reinforcing the ability of the state 
to recognise and protect these rights, while also ensuring a progressive realisation of 
such rights. Also significant is the fact that the judiciary, especially the 
Constitutional Court, is bestowed the authority to be the custodians of all 
constitutional matters, but must ensure that all its actions conforms with the doctrine 
of separation of powers and upholds the rule of law. As far as I am concerned, these 
aspects, among others, are inherent preconditions for any constitutionalist state to be 
judged as being properly functional, especially within the context of ensuring 
effective and accountable people centered governance. Thus, why was/is South 
Africa’s Constitution said to be best in the world? 
 
2. Problem Statement and Research Question 
It has been twenty-four years since South Africa changed from being an apartheid 
state into a democratic state. It is trite that under apartheid, human rights could not 
develop (Klotz, 1995; Sarkin, 1999; Langsberg & Mackay, 2006), largely because 
the characterisation of the system was squarely that it stood opposed to fundamental 
human freedoms. Most importantly, the much yearned non-racial human wellbeing 
and swift social development could not be realised. The apartheid system was disdain 
of established constitutional law principles, while advocating racial oppression, 
                                                             
1 The Chapter 9 Institutions refer to state entities such as the Public Protector, the South African 
Human Rights Commission, The Auditor General, The Commission for the Promotion and Protection 
of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, The Commission for Gender 
Equality and the Electoral Commission. 
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acute inequalities, poverty, underdevelopment and disenfranchisement of native 
African masses amongst others. On the other hand, the post-1994 democratic state 
was envisioned to become a different establishment. In the main, it ushered in a 
constitutional supremacy system of governance, which entailed that the law in the 
Constitution reigns supreme over all other laws, and that all fundamental values 
enshrined in it must be given effect to by all state functionaries and non-state social 
justice activists alike. As a result, such noticeable changes that came with the 1994-
dispensation promised hope, and left many amongst the previously oppressed 
communities ululating with the understanding that their livelihood would change for 
the better. Twenty-four years later, things still look the same, and in fact, getting 
worse in various instances.  
One of the major questions that this article poses is actually about establishing the 
context within which the Constitution is described as the best in the world. That is, 
how best is South Africa’s Constitution if it cannot speedily facilitate social and 
economic transformation, tenets which are essential towards normalising society? 
What criteria was used to determine this? In this regard, it is significant to understand 
the purpose of a Constitution. The article further seeks to deduce if strict legal norms 
can be relied upon to resolve socio-economic problems inherited from the apartheid 
regime? Further, it questions the significance of having the best Constitution in the 
world while majority of people in society remain stuck in shackles of poverty and 
underdevelopment. Subsequently, it begs a question whether the crafters of the 
Constitution appreciated the inherent relationship between universal human intuitive 
moral obligations, and the strict legal norms that are embedded in the Constitution. 
 
3. Research Approach 
Frantz Fanon’s Pitfalls of National Consciousness, in his The Wretched of the Earth 
is what necessitated this article. Fanon stated that the colonial domination, which 
was accompanied by imperialism, culminated in the destruction of the humane spirit 
and fundamental personality of the oppressed “leader”, the would be “liberator”, who 
grew to become a so called democratic leader of a constitutional state. Drawing from 
Fanon’s philosophy, a democratically elected leader who lacks a clear social and 
political program for the future is a threat to post liberation social stability and human 
wellbeing. In this case, it is crucial to question the extent to which such a leader will 
positively impact on the lives of the proletariat and how the Constitution enables 
such a leader to do so. That is, in the midst of South Africa’s Constitution being 
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described as the best, how do we envisage to see such a tool being deployed to 
eliminate social strife and inequalities inherited from the past? This article challenges 
this narrative of the ‘best Constitution’ with the view to highlighting key social and 
constitutional issues which the post-1994 democratic dispensation should have 
pursued, instead of wanting to rely on the “best Constitution” phraseology as a 
beacon of hope, a flawed one for that matter. Therefore, I exposit better 
constitutional thinking that could have been adopted in order to ensure that the post-
1994 leaders and the state would rapidly fast-track a process of detaching themselves 
from the colonial power structure which does nothing to alter people’s living 
conditions, except for entrenching the ‘leader’, the so called “liberator”, as demigod. 
Therefore, I proffer some intense anti-colonial perspective, but still require from the 
elected representatives and state some extent of alignment concerning what should 
constitute the best for the people particularly with regards to espoused transformative 
ideals that underpinned the struggles against colonialism, imperialism and apartheid.  
This article is analytical in approach, and relies on secondary data obtained from 
scholarly written texts. It essentially adopts a theory-based analytical approach, 
relying on Franz Fanon’s view on liberation fighters who emerge as leaders after 
struggle for freedom. Second, Klare’s Transformative Constitutionalism and 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach in order to describe key elements that should 
define what is required of strict normative legal norms in a society ravaged by 
poverty, inequalities and unemployment. Such elements are used to explain the gaps 
that exists within South Africa’s twenty-four year old constitutional edifice. To 
strengthen the arguments on decolonising the system and dissemination of 
knowledge, I employ Fanon’s philosophical thoughts on the need for building a 
leader who possesses such a pedigree, whose main focus is developing a clear social 
program that alters people’s lives for the better, as opposed to building a leader who 
remain stuck in a domain of praising normative texts that do little or nothing to serve 
the people. This methodological approach is best suited for explaining the post-
liberation trends and the pitfalls of blanket implementation of externally drawn 
normative instruments that operates on the basis of foreign sympathy or supposed 
instruction, with no discernible intent to alter people’s lives. 
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4. Theoretical Framework 
4.1. Franz Fanon on Change and Leadership 
Fanon (1961; 1963, p. 148) posited that under normal circumstances, leadership 
which emerges from post liberation struggles should resemble an epitome of hope, 
at least in the eyes of the mass proletariat on the ground. This entails that those who 
were/are involved in the fight for democracy against oppression of humankind ought 
to understand such transitions from oppression to freedom as precursor of human 
empowerment, freedom and an intrinsic need to safeguard human wellbeing. Most 
notably, Fanon laments the thinking of unconscious liberators whose attitude is more 
preoccupied with replacing the former oppressor. That is, they often lack a strategic 
plan except perfecting a takeover paradigm, which is frequently filled with nothing 
but rhetoric and symbols of envying the former oppressor. As a result, the masses 
are left with a system which remains virtually unchanged, except that the face of 
government seem different. Fanon describes this as having a willing national 
bourgeoisie who steps in the shoes of his former oppressor, and who is wholly 
willing to be a transmission line between the nation and the capitalism captains. He 
attributes this to lack of sufficient material and or intellectual resources needed to 
facilitate an effective social and economic transition. Because such a liberator 
becomes an intermediary, a transmission line, his role in capacitating the state to 
ensure the welfare of its citizens will be restricted. And owing to limited intellectual 
prowess, the liberator gets told what normative framework, through the 
Constitutions, is perfect for his country. This is particularly applicable to South 
Africa, where the post-1994 dispensation inherited systems that were not invented 
to service all citizens, yet a peculiar normative legal rules were invented and 
implemented under the guise of departing from an awful past. But when closely 
scrutinized, one deduces that the Constitution, which has been elevated to a status of 
the best constitution in the world, does nothing about practical altering of social 
arrangements. Instead, it still leaves it up to the mass proletariat to devise survival 
techniques notwithstanding the perverse historic deprivations that restricts any such 
attempts. So, deducible from Fanon is an ideal that the post-liberation leadership 
must be intellectually equipped, and be ready to craft its own normative and 
institutional frameworks that advances motive forces that underpinned such 
struggles against human oppression. Further, legal norms that does little to alter 
people’s living conditions are superfluous. 
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4.2. Transformative Constitutionalism (TC) 
Drawing from Fanon, one notices that the Constitution and all its accompanying 
legislative frameworks have a significant role to play in a post-liberation struggle 
state. Most specifically, law, which also brings political changes, must help in 
transforming and improving living conditions of the poor electorate. Hence, the need 
to continuously scrutinise South Africa’s social transformation and how this impact 
human wellbeing and societal stability. In this regard, Karl Klare’s coined 
Transformative Constitutionalism (TC), which has added an unprecedented impetus 
to the “best Constitution” narrative. Klare coined Transformative Constitutionalism, 
which he used to describe the nature of the post-1994 Constitution. He posited 
Transformative Constitutionalism as a “long-term project of constitutional 
enactment, interpretation and enforcement committed to transforming a country’s 
political, legal and social institutions, and power relations in a democratic, 
participatory and egalitarian direction” (1998, p. 146).  
Klare emphasized that the Constitution offered an enterprise to induce major social 
change through non-violent political processes immensely grounded in law (1998, 
p. 150). Nevertheless, noticeable is the fact that Klare did not fully explain the 
narrative or content of such social change and how the Constitution ought to advance 
it. This has created a lacuna, which necessitates continuous discourses on how Klare 
envisioned the Constitution to facilitate such change. In fact, the social change 
concept is central to this article because it has become clear that the law is struggling 
to deliver meaningful social change. According to Van Marle (2009, p. 288), Klare’s 
Transformative Constitutionalism is a project which encompasses an approach to the 
Constitution and law in general that is committed to transforming political, socio-
economic and legal practices in a manner that it will radically alter existing 
assumptions about law, politics, economics and society in general. Further that the 
Constitution is made transformative not only because of its traditional accounts of 
the rule of law, but because of its capacity to reach out to other disciplines such as 
philosophy, political theory and sociology. But how is this helpful if socio-economic 
situations of majority of those who were excluded by apartheid remain unaltered? It 
might as well suggest that alternative strategies ought to be sought in order to 
effectuate the Constitution’s legal and social norms. Further, does this Constitution 
do enough to effect such envisioned social change? 
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4.3. The Capabilities Approach (CA) 
It has become apparent that there is an indispensable need to locate alternatives that 
augment the constitutional outlook on social issues. Nussbaum’s Capabilities 
Approach is one such an example of an instrument which offers alternative doctrines 
that may be relied upon in order to properly interpret and analyze the effectiveness, 
or lack thereof, of Klare’s TC narrative, especially when it concerns the social 
change phenomenon. First conceived by Amartya Sen, the CA is concerned with 
functionings (person’s achievements or what a person may value doing or being), 
capabilities (freedoms a person enjoys) and agency (ability to act in pursuit of what 
one values) (Sen, 1985, p. 203). Sen formulated the CA as a tool to evaluate human 
well-being in society. That is, to determine successes in human life, certain elements 
ought to be accepted as primary determinants. Sen constructed a strong relationship 
between education, development and freedom (Sen, 1999), and the rights language.  
Martha Nussbaum later expanded the CA, becoming its renown proponent, further 
describing it as a special species of human rights approach (2007, p. 21) and a 
normative tool to serve and enrich our common humanity (1992, p. 214), owing to 
its ability to resolve deprivations afflicting humankind, the previously 
disadvantaged, women and the poor (2006, p. 48). Both Sen and Nussbaum 
emphasizes that the CA is best suited to evaluate well-being, and in this case, it can 
be used to assess whether social change has meaningfully permeated the 
Constitution’s rights-based approaches. The CA embraces a humanist stance which 
seeks to safeguard ‘a better life for all’, a popular slogan which was adopted by the 
African National Congress (ANC) after nine-teen nineties. The CA also offers an 
alternative discourse in policy terms, concerning modern instrumental practices 
(Wright, 2012, p. 421). Hence, the CA possesses an intuitive strength to reinforce 
legal norms if applied concurrently with the Constitution’s fundamental values of 
human dignity, equality and fundmental freedoms. The CA theoretical 
underpinnings provide coherent methods in terms of which to assess social change. 
When closely considered, the CA carries with it, an intuitive moral reasoning, which 
in accordance with Dworkin’s interpretation theory, requires a particular approach 
to the reading of the Constitution. I venture to say such an approach must conform 
and resonate moral values that safeguards humanity. Epistemologically speaking, it 
means departing from reading and teaching the Constitution as though it is the only 
avenue to seek refuge when confronted with challenges, especially those that can be 
resolved through dialogue or other methods that invokes and sees moral reasoning 
as a transcending yet complementary approach.  
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5. The Constitution, 1996: A Political or Social Constitution? 
Alberts has argued that democratic constitutions are aimed at regulating the exercise 
of political power according to democratic norms, and that they also ought to 
establish institutions to reflect these norms (2009, p. 127). The essence of this 
establishment is to ensure that the constitutional rules established under 
constitutionalism make democracy work by enhancing the systems’ legitimacy and 
efficacy. But unlike other constitutions of the world, South Africa’s Constitution 
developed under extremely unique circumstances. As a result, it inherited an inherent 
obligation to transform society across all landscapes, moving beyond mere 
regulation. This entailed that the Constitution would also be expected to provide both 
normative and moral guidance in the process of resolving past and resultant social, 
political and economic challenges. That is, the Constitution was expected to assist in 
altering relations between the state and citizens, legal institutions and politics, social 
and economic development, and various other interactions. So, all these aspects 
necessitate the question whether South Africa’s Constitution is a political or social 
one, or is it both? These questions, regardless how they are answered, are similarly 
critical because they enable us to understand the essence of the best constitution 
narrative. 
Gee and Webber (2010, p. 173) describes a political constitution as one that is 
associated with holding politicians in government to account through political 
processes and in political institutions. I posit that a political Constitution is that 
which focuses on establishing normative instruments and institutions that are 
primarily concerned with regulating the exercise of political power, and managing 
international relations by giving a posture that seeks to say all is well. A political 
constitution also enshrines appealing human rights norms but says nothing about 
seriously altering past injustices. Its central appeal is to satisfy the international 
community that there is conformity to established international norms and standards, 
even if this occurs at the expense of justice and the motive forces of struggles against 
oppression. On the other hand, a social Constitution would be premised on 
guaranteeing fundamental freedoms, safeguarding human wellbeing by 
meaningfully empowering the state to serve and protect its citizens and does 
accommodate and promote diversity. Thus, a combination of both social and 
political, which I call socio-political constitution, would encompass both, but go 
further to advocate that as it guides healing the country from its awful past, justice 
must transcend peace and reconciliation, especially in view of the human rights 
violations that preceded democracy. Further, it would ensure that the state holds 
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strategic economic centers in order to ensure that state capacity in terms of its fiscus 
is augmented. 
Within the above context, one is eager to exposit the nature of South Africa’s 
Constitution, especially in the context of its ability to advance a morally grounded 
and pragmatic social change. This is also helpful in understanding how and why the 
best constitution found its way to dominate most constitutional law discourses within 
and outside the country. To achieve this, I venture to rely on examining the concept 
of state capacity versus the Constitution sentimentalized enshrinement of human 
rights. 
 
6. Rights Realization and State Capacity 
Can rights realization and social change be dissociated from the concept of 
availability of resources? This question demonstrates the importance of appreciating 
the synthesis between the realization of rights and the state capacity, especially in 
the context of South Africa where the post-apartheid dispensation tasked the state 
with the central role of developing human capabilities among others. This is 
particularly important given that the prescripts of constitutional law enjoins state to 
assume specific obligations towards citizens, which derives from a long-held 
traditional view associated with liberal constitutions that states ought to protect 
human rights and account for them. In accordance with a welfarists’ perspective, 
Nussbaum too stresses that the state should devise strategies to ensure minimal 
provision of services needed to attain human well-being (West, 2001, p. 1902). 
As stated, I have struggled to fathom why the Constitution, 1996 has been elevated 
to the status of being the best in the world. Often I hear repeated proselytization 
which simply speaks to two aspects. Firstly, this Constitution is the best because it 
entrenched appealing legal norms and established greater institutions. But such 
institutions and human rights norms (courts, separation of powers, tribunals, 
parliament, etc) being referred to are also found in many other jurisdictions. Second, 
and in the main, that it entrenched socio-economic rights, and made them justiciable 
to the effect that citizens could claim them from the state through courts. Such socio-
economic rights are also found in various countries. In fact, the Netherlands does 
provide a much better and comprehensive social assistance to its citizens as 
compared to South Africa. Therefore, upon closer scrutiny, I struggled to understand 
how these aspects would render the Constitution to be labelled best in the world. 
This is simply because I consider these aspects to be ordinary tenets needed for any 
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democratic state to function effectively. To make matter worse, although socio-
economic rights were entrenched, arguably as part of advancing socio-economic 
transformation, a regard was not had on the need to capacitate the economic capacity 
of the state, which Nussbaum stressed is a precondition were the state to be able to 
fulfill its constitutional obligations regarding improving people’s socio-economic 
entitlements and advancing human development.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The object of this article was to critique the narrative that South Africa has the best 
Constitution in the world, in an attempt to develop a new constitutional law thought 
especially within the context of teaching and dissemination of the knowledge of 
constitutional law. I had sought to achieve this by focusing on leadership and post-
liberation change, social transformation in a constitutional setting, and the realization 
of rights and human wellbeing in particular. Through the extrapolation of Fanon’s 
crucial elements on leadership and change, I have demonstrated that leaders who are 
intellectually constricted can easily be swallowed by the system of their former 
oppressor, to an extent that they forget the motive forces of the struggle against 
oppression, and begin to see themselves featuring (as unconscious intermediaries) in 
the capitalist system that perpetuates exploitation and underdevelopment of the mass 
proletariat. It has demonstrated that the struggle against apartheid was not about 
producing the best constitution in the world. Instead, it was mainly about fighting 
for the restoration of human worth, equality and social justice among others. 
Subsequently, I conclude that the best constitution narrative was merely a political 
ploy, engineered through external influence, to convince the proletariat that all is 
well. As a result, the process produced a Constitution which to a large extent 
protected social and economic arrangements established under apartheid and before. 
Therefore, Nussbaum’s approach on human capabilities necessitates the capacitation 
of the state in order that the state will be able to intervene towards improving 
people’s living conditions through provisioning of adequate human entitlements, 
which should have been a fundamental priority. It is asserted that for the Constitution 
to be meaningfully transformative, strict legal norms ought to be indispensably 
harmonized with clear moral doctrines that are inherently intuitive in humanity. The 
theoretical implications of Klare’s social change, Fanon on leadership and change 
and Nussbaum on human capabilities and wellbeing suggest that South Africa’s 
social and economic transformation ideals require a solid normative moral enterprise 
in the first place, which may be complemented by the existing legal normative 
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establishment.  
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